# Internal Security Situations In Nigeria And Its Effect On Country's Foreign Relations' Experiences Between 1999 And 2012

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ABSTRACT:- One of the core values on which relationship of nation states' are predicated upon is the unreserved desire to ensure both the territorial integrity of her geography as well as the security of her citizens. This is true irrespective of the geography and demography. Thus, this study examined internal security situations in Nigeria and its effect on country's foreign relations' experiences between 1999 and 2012. The study employed a mixed method that combined the historical and survey of ex-post facto type of research designs. Six states: Bauchi, Bayelsa, Delta, Kaduna, Ondo, and Plateau were purposively selected as crises ridden zones in Nigeria from 1999 to 2012. Multi-stage cluster sampling was employed for selecting respondents (two ambassadorial personnel each from five countries, 20 professors respectively from International Relations and Political Science, 15 high rank officers from each Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs). The instruments used for the study were two sets of questionnaires and structured interview guide. Descriptive statistics was adopted for the analysis of data.Results showed that insecurity affected Nigeria's image among the comity of nations while Nigerian citizens were confronted by unwarranted delays and searches at entry points of different countries within the globe. In conclusion, insecurity conditions, which pervaded the Nigerian environment, projected a negative image for Nigeria in the international community.It is recommended that Nigeria must effectively combat insecurity so as to improve the image of the country both internally and externally.

Keywords: Security, Insecurity, Foreign Relations, National Image

## I. INTRODUCTION

In Nigeria today, the vigorous transformation of the ethno-religious identities had been the basis of many known violent conflict in the country and the basis upon which the national security of the country is stressed and overarched. Bamgbose stated that Nigeria had witnessed not less than forty major civil disturbances in the form of ethno-religious and communal clashes between 1999 and 2002. He also cited Groupson-Paul (2003: 24-27) who puts it at fifty-three between May 1999 and May 2003. Thus according to Bamgbose (2011: 25): The mobilization of ethnic tendencies and nationalism had given rise to the metamorphosis of different ethnic identities and militias all in the context of advancing their long suppressed interest in the democratic space. From the violent protest of the Niger delta over the perceived injustice for resource control and true federalism, the Itsekiri-Ijaw violence in the Delta over land ownership and boundary claims, the Ife-Modakeke communal clashes, the menace of Oodua People's Congress and its accompanying violence in Lagos and Shagamu areas, the formation of Arewa People's Congress(APC), the Movement for the Actualization of the Biafra (MASSOB) continued agitation for Biafran state, Sharia conflict and the demand for confederation and the inter/intra ethnic religious sectarian which is more pronounced across the Northern part of the country, identities continued to expand in expression and dimension particularly as groups used it as bait to advance their interest in the power relation among various groupings contesting for control under the democratic rule in the country.

## An Overview of Internal Insecurity in NigeriaMilitant Activities in the Niger Delta

The various activities of militants have created a state of general insecurity in the region. Methods of operation of the militants, which includes kidnapping and hostage taking (with over 200 foreign nationals as victims), blowing/shutting down of oil installations and facilities, setting off of car bombs, and illegal oil bunkering (estimated at between 80,000 and 300, 000 bbl/day) has negatively impacted Nigeria's economic development, experienced fall in in-flow of foreign direct investment from about \$20 billion in 2007 to about \$6.1 billion in 2010 (Nwogwugwu, Alao&Egwuonwu, 2012).

The impact of the militancy on jobs creation and availability was highly felt. As the Editor of *Punch Newspaper* puts it: As a result of the activities of militants in the Niger delta region, "SPDC (Shell Petroleum Development Company) retrenched 3, 500 workers in September 2007" (*Punch Newspapers*, 2007a: 14). Indoroma Petrochemical Company shut down its operations thereby rendering over 3, 000 youths jobless and aggravating the unemployment situation (*Sunday Trust Newspaper*, 2007). Restiveness has reduced growth in the business sector. As a consequence of militant activity Royal Dutch Shell has seen its production dropping from one million bpd to about 380,000 bpd at its Bonny terminal in the South of the Delta. In Rivers state, over 80% of the companies have stopped operations, as expatriates have either gone to their home countries or relocated to safer environments (Ejibunu, 2007, cited in Nwogwugwu, *et. al.*, 2012:29).

The impact of militancy on the inflow of foreign direct investment was also very significant and as TimiAlaibe asserts:By January 2009, militancy in the Niger Delta had virtually crippled Nigeria's economy. Investment inflow to the upstream sub - sector of the oil industry had dwindled remarkably. Exasperated foreign investors had begun redirecting their investments to Angola and Ghana as preferred destinations over Nigeria. At that point Angola surpassed Nigeria as Africa's highest crude oil producer. This dwindling investments in the critical oil and gas sector threatened Nigeria's capacity to grow its crude oil reserves as planned .... Clearly, insecurity in the Niger Delta was identified as key reason why investors were leaving for more stable business opportunities in Africa... Sabotage, oil siphoning rackets and kidnappings of oil workers by suspected militants further threatened the operations of the oil companies and exerted immense pressure on the Nigerian economy (Alaibe, 2010, cited in Nwogwugwu, *et. al.*, 2012: 31).

It is not surprising that the country is still losing more on daily basis; this is because conflicts consume a large portion of the countries national resources. The government has no choice but to expend a large amount of money maintaining the peace-keeping forces. The oil companies in self-preservative efforts spent money to hire security agents. The vigilante groups on their own parts too were not left out in their own bid to bring about security in the community in their spending to procure arms. These were much needed resources that can be used to improve Nigeria but have been diverted into servicing violence. Nzelu (2002) remarks that "the NNPC lost products worth N10.2 billion in 2001 as a result of pipelines vandalism" (Fidelis &Egbere, 2013: 8). As at June 2006, exports have been cut by 20%. National power generation had reduced by more than 25% as a result of shutting off of gas to three major power stations (Olusola, 2013).

#### Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria

The biggest terrorist threat which Nigeria is facing today is from *Jama'atuAhlis Sunna Lidda'awatiWal-Jihad*, 'People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad', known by its Hausa name *Boko Haram* (Western education is sacrilege or sinful).The group was first known internationally after a sectarian violence in Nigeria in the year 2009, when its fighters frequently clashed with Nigeria's central government. Since 2011, the group was responsible for thousands of killings in Nigeria. It does not have a clear structure or evident chain of command, and there is debate about if *Boko Haram* has links to terror outfits outside Nigeria. However, it is highly criticized by very prominent political and religious leaders like Mu'azuBabangidaAliyu, the Niger State governor, who said that "Islam is known to be a religion of peace and does not regard violence and crime in any form" and Boko Haram doesn't represent Islam, also, the Sultan of SokotoSa'aduAbubakar has called the sect "anti-Islamic" and, "an embarrassment to Islam."

The group's activities are starting to take its toll on the economy. In a Reuters report made by Ohuocha, he stated that:

If the Nigerian government gets distracted by Boko Haram rather than economic growth, then it could start to witness weakening economic fundamentals," ... Nigeria's security bill has risen to 20% of spending in the 2012 budget from 16% in 2010, leaving less money for much-needed infrastructure projects and for work on reforms to the power and other social and industrial sectors...It has become President Goodluck Jonathan's biggest headache and is threatening to divert the government's attention from the pressing but thorny issue of weaning the economy away from its reliance on crude oil exports...It is diverting money away from needed infrastructure spending and could be costing as much as 2% of the country's economic output.(Ohuocha, 2012; 2), The activities of Boko Haram in the north affected Nigeria's socio-economic life. Most businesses have closed and even tourism has been affected with Nigeria losing over 80 billion naira in the tourism sector as a result of insecurity. This fact was disclosed by the Director-General of the Nigeria Tourism Development Corporation, Otunba Olusegun Runsewe (Nigerian Best Forum, 2012). According to Babatunde and Olanrewaju:Tourism is a viable sector with sufficient economic, sociocultural benefits. However, for a country to reap these benefits, a country must be free of security threats. Security constitutes a sensitive aspect of tourism. Nigeria has abundant tourist centres. However, they have made negligible contributions to sustainable development due to the security challenges or insecurity saga perpetuated by the incessant bombing activities by Boko Haram. (Babatunde&Olanrewaju, 2014:60) Sports are also an economic activity affected by insecurity in Nigeria. According to Ogujiofor&Deemua, 2013), high profile friendly football match between the Super Eagles and the Samba Boys of Brazil scheduled for August 2012 was cancelled as a result of the continued insurgence in the country. According to them:The activities of the Boko Haram sect are gradually taking its toll on the economy of the north and Nigeria in general. Most match venues in the north that used to host premier league matches every weekend are now like cemeteries, gate fees and ticket, buying of club shirts and other items, T.V. rights, sponsorship deals and other financial benefits derived from these matches are jeopardized as a result of the insurgence. Nigerian government would have generated up to 10 million dollars and above from gate fee and T.V right and other commercial benefit if the proposed match with Brazil had not been cancelled (Ogujiofor, &Deemua, 2013: 28).Touched by the degree of insecurity that overwhelmed the country, the Federal Government deported 7000 illegal immigrants from Chad and Niger Republics (*The Punch*, 2012). In another development, the wanton destruction to lives and properties prompted the United Nations (UN) Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon to ask the Federal Government to mobilize needed forces to quell the *Boko Haram* terror attacks. Also, the United Nations suspended travels to Nigeria over the Abuja blast and simultaneously became worried over the death toll occasioned by *Boko Haram* attacks(Bamgbose, 2013). The National Security Tracker puts the total figures of Boko Haram casualties at 1547 as of 12<sup>th</sup> December 2012 (CFR, 2014).

#### Synopsis of Nigeria's Foreign Relations Experiences in the Fourth Republic

The preceding sections have explained the varied experiences of Nigeria's foreign relations with countries in many parts of the world from the onset of Nigeria's Fourth Republic in 1999 to 2012, under three different political administrations. The discussions revealed that the former President, Olusegun Obasanjo administration faced a lot of difficulties in initiating new foreign relations or renewing strained former relations with elements of the global community because of the inherited international relations problems created by the defunct military administrations. However, President Obasanjo succeeded in reinstating old relations as well as making new friends for Nigeria in the international community. These foreign relations were sustained almost throughout the understudied period, only with exception to the years of the defunct President Yar'Adua's administration, which suffered losses or decline as a result of poor health and consequent death of the president.

The old and new foreign relations that Nigeria had with other states in the international community, especially with the United States of America, yielded some positive results, though with limitations caused by the insecurity level of the domestic environment of the Nigerian society. The most beneficial in terms of contribution to the general welfare of Nigeria's domestic environment, was with the United States of America. On the other hand, the country that benefitted most from Nigeria, in terms of patronage for international goods and services was the People's Republic of China. The next in line was the United States of America.

Nigeria expended time and resources in ensuring collective peace, progress, and development in African states without tangible gains to show for its efforts. As evidently shown in the next chapter, Nigeria has rather reaped undue hostility and relative disregard from many of the African countries in response to Nigeria's efforts in African welfare involvements. Moreover, many other countries that would have liked to have foreign relations in Nigeria, especially in the area of engaging in foreign direct investment were still skeptical about their safety and that of their intended businesses. These led to shortcomings in Nigeria's foreign relations outings. Meanwhile, if the security condition in the domestic environment of Nigeria was favourable, this situation will not have been so. The insecurity situation in the country projected a negative image of Nigeria in the international community, thereby disfavouring the country's foreign relations outings (Adewunmi, 2015).

## II. THE PROBLEM

The problem of this study is that there has been increasing internal insecurity in the country, a condition that has been limiting foreign relations outcomes for the country and its citizens. It, therefore, requires urgent attention. Moreover, failure to adequately attend to this problem places the Nigerian state on the verge of degeneration into a pariah state.Keen observation from daily experiences of those who either reside in or regularly visit Nigeria, news reports, and scholarly publications (Nosaze, 2005; Adeogun, 2006; Ishaku, 2009; Alozieuwa, 2010; Allen &Okeke-Uzodike, 2010, just to mention but a few cases) show that threats to internal security in Nigeria has been geometrically accumulating. In many cases, loss of lives has often resulted, as in the case of the mass demonstration over removal of subsidy on petrol pump price, experienced from January 9 to 16, 2012.Moreover, since 1999, many largely differentiated groups of individuals, who protest one situation of injustice or the other, or even miscreants, who protest unjustifiable cases, hiding under the prevalent situation of confusion and insecurity to make the society become increasingly insecure for human habitation, growth, and development, have been surfacing and evolving. Instances of these groups are the Boko Haram, the Egbesu Boys, the Bakassi Boys, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), and the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB).

These groups have often served as the tools through which internal insecurity in the country has been heightened because they have either been used at one time or the other to create trouble situations or to worsen the level of existing unfavourable conditions, which the government often negatively react to, thereby worsening the situation. An example is the incidents following the alleged abduction and killing of 19 soldiers of the Nigerian Army by the Tiv ethnic militia group along the Benue/Taraba border in October, 2001, and the subsequent reprisal attack by the Nigerian following the orders of the President of Nigeria – President Olusegun Obasanjo (*This Day*, October 24, 2001; Ike, 2002).These problems, coupled with incessant kidnapping and abduction of individuals, including expatriate workers, have become serious security threats to everyone in Nigeria. The dissidents have not spared the foreign investors, and have, thereby compelled many countries and investors in the international community to become sceptical of their safety in operating in the country. So, some countries have warned their citizens of insecurity in Nigeria. Besides, some citizens of some countries, including South Africa, have been extremely hostile to Nigerians in their countries. Indeed, the Nigerian state has been in dire security need as a means of achieving its foreign relations goals. Therefore, the main objective of this study is to investigate the internal security challenges in Nigeria as it reflects on her foreign relations between 1999 and 2012.

# III. METHODOLOGY

**Research Design:** The design for this study was a mixed methodology that combined the historical, survey, and ex-post facto research design.

**Population:** are Delta, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Kaduna, Ondo and Plateau states. The study also purposively selected few scholars in the academia, foreign embassies, and government institutions as additional population of the study.

**Sample Selection:** For the purpose of this study, I have selected six Nigerian states that have been ridden by violence during the period under investigation. These states were considered representative enough for this study because they have experienced incessant killings and kidnappings, ethnic conflicts, religious unrest, unleashed terror and violence the overall effect of which reverberated throughout the country. For these reasons, their experiences adequately mirrored the prevailing situation in the country. These selected states are Delta, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Kaduna, Ondo, and Plateau states. There were 100 enlightened interviewees/respondents who are scholars from the public and private sectors of the country. The researcher personally conducted the interviews with this calibre of people either in their offices or other venues of their choice. She also personally administered the questionnaire to them.

**Method of Data Collection and Procedure:** In the process of conducting this research, we adopted mainly the mixed research methods. These included interviews and documentary information. This procedure is intended to enhance the quality of data collected and to improve the validity and reliability of the findings of the study.

**Instrumentation:** The instrument was a self-developed instrument based on the core of the phenomena studied which is to investigate the effects of Nigeria's internal security challenges on the country's foreign relations between 1999 and 2012. To validate the reliability of the instrument, a test and re-test method was used and yielded crobach alpha of 0.875.

**Method of Data Analysis:** The data collected was analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) processes to generate the values needed for the analyses. Specifically, descriptive statistics was applied in the analysis of the data collected.

IV.	RESULTS
1 V.	<b>KESULIS</b>

 Table 1: Respondents' Reactions to the Question on Effects of Nigeria's Level of Internal Insecurity on the Country's Foreign Relations between 1999 and 2012

S/N	Variables	Responses	Frequencies/Percentages
1	I am aware of the level of insecurity in Nigeria limiting	Agree	100 (100.0)
	foreign relations outcomes for the country and its	Disagree	Nil
	citizens between 1999 and 2012		Nil
2	2 Nigeria had poor national image as a result of the insecurity level within the country between 1999 and 2012	Agree	100 (100.0)
		Disagree	Nil
		Undecided	Nil
3	3 Nigeria was in dire security need as a means of		100 (100.0)
	achieving her international relations goals between	Disagree	Nil
1999 and 2012	1999 and 2012	Undecided	Nil
4	Governments and citizens of many African and non-	Agree	100 (100.0)
	African countries were often hostile to Nigerian	Disagree	Nil
	citizens as a result of the national image caused by	Undecided	Nil

		1	
	Nigeria's insecurity condition between 1999 and 2012		
5	Countries like the United States, the Britain, and other	Agree	100 (100.0)
	European countries warned their citizens to be careful	Disagree	Nil
	with travelling to certain parts of Nigeria between 1999	Undecided	Nil
	and 2012		
6	Many countries and their citizens were afraid to	Agree	100 (100.0)
	transact with Nigerian citizens between 1999 and 2012	Disagree	Nil
		Undecided	Nil
7	Governments and citizens of many African and non-	Agree	100 (100.0)
	African countries were often suspicious of Nigerian	Disagree	Nil
	citizens as a result of the national image caused by the	Undecided	Nil
	level of insecurity conditions in Nigeria between 1999		
	and 2012		
8	Citizens of South African and many other countries in	Agree	100 (100.0)
	the world were often extremely hostile to Nigerians,	Disagree	Nil
	treating them like criminals in their countries between	Undecided	Nil
	1999 and 2012		
9	Tourism and cultural exchanges that are sources of	Agree	100 (100.0)
	revenue to the country were greatly affected by the	Disagree	Nil
	insecurity issues in the country between 1999 and 2012	Undecided	Nil
	Source: Field Data, August, 2013		N = 100

Table 1 displays data on some of the effects of the state of insecurity in Nigeria on the country's foreign relations between 1999 and 2012. In order to gather information on this, the first three questions on table five interrogated the general impression of the populace regarding the level of their awareness of the state of insecurity in Nigeria, the implication on the country's national image and how this reflected on the foreign relations outcome of the country. There was 100% positive response to these questions as the entire sample of all respondents in the professional category indicated that they were aware that the level of insecurity in Nigeria limited foreign relations outcomes for the country and its citizens during the period of study. Also, that Nigeria had poor national image resulting from the state of domestic insecurity level within the country as at the time. This means that all the respondents recognized and affirmed that Nigeria was in dire security need as a means of achieving her international relations goals between 1999 and 2012. In view of all these, it was not surprising that Nigeria and her citizens lost credibility and regard among some countries in the comity of nations. To this end, questions four, five, six, seven and eight interrogated the diverse perceptions of some countries and how their views impacted on the ways and manner that they conducted relationship with Nigeria as a country and the treatment given to her citizens especially on the shores of some of these countries. All respondents in this category acknowledged that governments and citizens of many African and non-African countries were often hostile to Nigerian citizens as a result of the national image caused by Nigeria's prevalent insecurity condition between 1999 and 2012. Countries like the United States, Britain, and other European countries warned their citizens to be careful with travelling to certain parts of Nigeria between this period, also that many countries and their citizens were afraid to transact business with Nigerian citizens also during this period; and that governments and citizens of many African and non-African countries were often suspicious of Nigerian citizens as a result of the national image caused by the level of insecurity in Nigeria during the period of study. This implies that the overall effect of insecurity in Nigeria was a negative impact on the country's national image which translated into negative treatments and hostility towards her citizens; as such foreign relations during this period was not very vibrant. Nigeria was seen as a risky country to transact business with, her citizens are seen to constitute threats within their own countries and even on the shores of other countries and are treated as such.

Finally, question nine of table five examined the economic implication of internal insecurity in Nigeria on her sources of revenue generation. All respondents were in 100% agreement that the state of insecurity had negative impact on sources of revenue generation. Since Nigeria has been declared unsafe for foreign investors as well as foreign visiting friends and many African and non-African countries have warned their nationals to be cautious within and around Nigeria and Nigerians as the case may be, tourism and cultural exchanges that are ready sources of revenue to the country were greatly affected by the insecurity issues in the country between 1999 and 2012.

<b>S</b> /	Variables	Responses	Frequencies/Percentages
Ν			
1	Improving the state of human rights in the country	Agree	100 (100.0)
	can help to improve security in Nigeria	Disagree	Nil
		Undecided	Nil
2	If deprivation, which ranges from extreme poverty	Agree	100 (100.0)
	to pollution are reduced, human security in	Disagree	Nil
	Nigeria can improve	Undecided	Nil
3	3 Improvement in primary healthcare can reduce the	Agree	100 (100.0)
	level of insecurity in Nigeria	Disagree	Nil
		Undecided	Nil
4	Improvement in provision of basic education for	Agree	42 (42.0)
	the common people can improve security	Disagree	15 (15.0)
	situations in Nigeria	Undecided	43 (43.0)
5	5 Cutting down on military spending can help improve security conditions in Nigeria by giving	Agree	42 (42.0)
		Disagree	4 (4.0)
	room for higher budgetary allocations to provision	Undecided	54 (54.0)
	of basic needs for the masses		
6	Limiting administrative corruption can result in	Agree	100 (100.0)
	improving human living conditions in Nigeria	Disagree	Nil
		Undecided	Nil
	Source: Field Data, August, 2013		N = 100

Table 2: Respondents' Reactions to the Question on Measures that can help Improve Security in Nigeria

The above table 2 presents the reactions of the respondents on how to improve internal security conditions in Nigeria. Respondents reactions to question one was 100% agreement indicating that positive steps towards improving the state of human rights in the country can help to improve security conditions in the country; meaning that when citizens know their fundamental human rights, they will be able to claim such rights, will not trade in such rights and will be able to follow due process to ensure such rights. It is believed that this will help to stabilize security in the country. Question two of the table suggested elimination of deprivation as a measure of improvement. To this, all respondents agreed that if conditions of deprivation ranging from extreme poverty to pollution are reduced, security in Nigeria can improve. This translates to the fact that if conditions of deprivation that leads to poverty, joblessness, and frustrations are improved upon, relative satisfaction of the people would bring about improvement of security in Nigeria. Question three addressed improvement in primary healthcare as a measure that can also reduce the level of domestic insecurity in the country. All respondents agreed that when health facilities are available and affordable to all and sundry, instances of agitation, frustration and aggressions would be curbed and this will go a long way to improve security in the country. Other measures suggested for improvement of the insecurity conditions in Nigeria include the improvement in provision of basic education for the common people, addressed in question four. However, only 42% of the respondents agreed with this suggestion, while 15% disagreed and 43% were simply undecided. This means that majority of the respondents do not feel that improvement in education would make much difference in improvement of the insecurity situation in the country. It implies that literacy is not really the problem of insecurity in Nigeria. Responses to question five indicated that majority of the respondents do not agree that cutting down on military spending would help improve security conditions. In fact, only 42% of the respondents were of the opinion that cutting down on military spending can help improve the security conditions in Nigeria, while 4% disagreed and 54% were undecided. This translates to the fact that even if higher budgetary allocations are concentrated towards provisioning of basic needs for the masses as against military spending, this might not make much difference since the real issue was not about acquiring military hardware. Finally, in question six, all respondents positively indicated that limiting or curbing administrative corruption can result in improving human living conditions in Nigeria thereby bringing about stable security. This implies that administrative corruption in all spheres is really the cankerworm that constitutes the greatest internal security challenge in Nigeria.

## V. DISCUSSIONS

From the data collected through the administered questionnaires, the level of insecurity in Nigeria limited foreign relations outcomes for the country and its citizens between 1999 and 2012. During this period, Nigeria had poor national image as a result of the insecurity crises within the country. The country had national image crises in the period covered by this study. This was why governments and citizens of many African and

non-African countries were often hostile to Nigerian citizens. The image was so bad that countries like the United States, Britain, and other European countries had to warn their citizens to be careful with travelling to certain parts of Nigeria during the period. In addition to the foregoing, many countries and their citizens were afraid to transact businesses with Nigerian citizens and were often suspicious of Nigerian citizens as a result of the national image crises caused by Nigeria's insecurity condition between 1999 and 2012. These countries and their citizens, especially South Africa, were often extremely hostile to Nigerians, treating them like criminals while in their countries during the period. To this end, it became evident that the country's security challenges seriously limited her foreign relations outcomes. Rather than that of friendship, the foreign relations outcomes were those of hostility toward Nigeria and the citizens of the country in many cases. Relating the foregoing to existing literature, the findings of the study agree with Damilola's (2010) observation that Nigeria's foreign relations were relatively stalled during the understudied period. The poor national image occasioned by the poor internal security conditions that were prevalent in Nigeria during the period was responsible for the poor international relations outcome. This agrees with the observation made by Chiakwelu (2010:28) that the image of a nation has the potential of becoming or determining the destiny of that nation and that "There's no arguing that the image we have of another country says a lot about how we view it as a tourist destination, a place to invest, or a source of consumer goods."

#### VI. CONCLUSION

From all indications, insecurity conditions, which pervaded the Nigerian environment, projected a negative image for Nigeria in the international community. The overall result and impression was of serious limitations on Nigeria's foreign relations in the international community. This was particularly prominent with regards to the welfare of Nigerian citizens in foreign countries, especially in their experiences/ordeals starting from the embassies and entry points of some of the foreign countries. Though the findings showed instances whereby the resultant insecurity in Nigeria brought about increased inter relations and alliances, most especially in the case of Nigeria/America co-operation, nonetheless these security challenges still constituted grave areas of utmost concern for the country. It is believed that these could be preventable through improvement of the living conditions of the general citizenry within the country; the result of which can be projected out invariably to give Nigeria better foreign relations. This is because a foreign relation that is limited to state-level interaction solely, without its benefits accruing to the citizens of the State as a whole can be regarded as unsuccessful.

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